



Report to the Secretary of Defense

A Snapshot of the Utilization of Forces

Report FY09-5

- **Recommendations to Study the Military Services' Force Utilization and Deployment Policies and Practices**

January 2009

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A Snapshot of the Utilization of Forces

TASK

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance and direction to the Joint Staff for the accomplishment of priorities and strategic objectives for 2008-2009. One of those priorities was to “reset, reconstitute and revitalize our forces.” The Chairman expressed concern that multiple deployments and insufficient dwell ratios were taking an unsustainable toll on the force.


Recognizing the value of human capital in an enterprise, the Members of the Defense Business Board (DBB) shared the Chairman’s concern for the health of the force. Although the Board was not equipped to conduct a deep analysis of the Military Services’ force utilization and deployment policies and practices, the DBB formed a Task Group to identify, if possible, where stress was occurring.

The Task Group was comprised of Michael Bayer (Co-Chairman), Fred Cook (Co-Chairman), and Dov Zakheim. The Military Assistants were COL Kevin Doxey, USA and Col Dale Marks, USAF.

PREMISE

The Task Group began its examination of force utilization with the premise that since the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, the armed forces have been operating under an increased operational tempo that has caused stress on certain parts of the force. The Task Group understood that the Military Services were meeting these requirements by employing the following practices: 1) longer than desirable deployments; 2) over-utilization of certain elements of the force; and 3) stop-loss, (i.e., the involuntary extension of a Servicemember’s Active Duty service). Further, the Task Group considered the Army’s and Marine Corps’ plans to increase end-strength to meet this increased demand, and concluded that increased end-strength alone may not relieve stress sufficiently if the current force is not being fully utilized. A summary of the roles and responsibilities of the various actors who influence end-strength and future force structure decisions is displayed below.

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PROCESS

The Task Group asked the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to examine pay records of all Active Duty military Servicemembers as of December 18, 2008, to determine the number of individuals that received payment of Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) over the 88 month period from September 2001 to December 2008. HFP is special pay for duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger¹. The Task Group reviewed this payroll data to develop a snapshot of the number of months that a Servicemember had received HFP, and to gain insights into the stress on the force. The Task Group chose to examine payroll records as a truth teller to provide a common unit of measure among all the armed forces.

The DFAS data produced a sample population of 1,466,753 personnel that was sorted by rank, grade and Service for both officers and enlisted personnel. DFAS excluded warrant officers from the examination, as those individuals could not be compared equally among all the Military Services.

¹ To determine which areas are designated to receive this special pay, commonly known as combat zones, the DBB used DoD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 7-A, Chapter 10, Figure 10-1, dated December 2008.

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The Task Group expressed the results using four stress categories. Although these categories are arbitrary, they provide a reasonable length of time for exposure to conditions that warrant HFP. A description of these categories follows:

- 25 months or greater = “OVER STRESSED” (individuals who have had multiple unit deployments and/or long-term augmentations)
- 17-24 months = “HIGH STRESSED” (individuals who have had two unit deployments and/or long-term augmentation)
- 13-16 months = “LOW STRESSED” (individuals who have had at least one unit deployment or long-term augmentation)
- 12 months or less = “NOT STRESSED” (individuals who have not been on unit deployment or long-term augmentation)

The Task Group identified two limitations associated with this analysis; the data contained individuals who could deploy but are in positions that prevent them from deploying, and/or individuals who are in career management paths that exclude them from any consideration for deployment. Specifically, the data does not:

- Distinguish between special cases (e.g., wounded warriors, non-deployable, or HFP for visits in and out of the combat zone),
- Include those individuals who entered and left during the 88 month period and may actually underestimate the over-stressed and high-stressed populations,
- Reflect the impact of Service specific policies on “dwell-time” to reduce stress on the force, and
- Exclude new personnel in training status who could not be deployed by the date of the sample. This also underestimates the OVER-STRESSED and HIGH-STRESSED populations.

While the Task Group felt that it would be prudent to examine the stress on the National Guard and Reserve, these forces were not included

in this review due to the challenges in comparing their deployment rates to those of the Active Duty. For example, the National Guard and the Reserve forces come in and out of the Active Duty population and therefore this population is not constant. Specific business rules would have to be established to account for this variable.

OBSERVATIONS

The data reveals that a significant number {74% (1,089K)} of Active Duty personnel had 12 months or less of combat duty while others {6% (93K)} had 25 months or less (see Figure 1). Officers and enlisted were similar to each other in terms of stress when viewed as a whole. The group with 12 months or less of HFP included 584,812 Active Duty personnel who have never deployed to a combat zone. Approximately 40% of the total force had no HFP during the period.





Figure 1

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The Task Group noticed a dissimilar level of stress among certain ranks over a selected period of time. Half of the Active Duty personnel who had never deployed (303,248) were junior individuals (E1 to E3 and O1 to O2) who were likely in training or waiting to deploy (see Figure 2). However, the E4 to E6 and the O3 to O4 groups appear to bear the greatest burden of stress. The following charts illustrate this point over the sample period (*reduced to 36 months for clarity of presentation*).



* Data examined included the period from September 2001 to December 2008.
For purposes of illustration, only the first 36 months is shown

Figure 2

Figures 3 and 4 further illustrate the need for the Department to hold the group with ≥ 25 months of HFP as is, and better manage the group with 13 – 16 months of HFP. Doing so might control the growth of the group with 17 – 24 months of HFP, and present the Department with an opportunity to reduce stress on those subjected to excessive deployments.

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Percent of Active Duty US Military Officers Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present




Figure 3

Percent of Active Duty US Military Enlisted Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present




Figure 4

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Among the Military Services, the Army appears to experience the greatest stress as a percentage of the population sample. However, the data does not identify those individuals subjected to excessive deployments and/or higher rates of deployment, (e.g. high demand/low density specialties, or those who may have left the Military Services because of stress). Figure 5 provides greater insight into the specific ranks that are bearing the greatest amount of stress, while highlighting Army specific data on those that are “OVER STRESSED.”

Figure 5 Summary of Officers and Enlisted that are “OVER STRESSED”

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
O-5 to O-6: 6% of sample (Army ~ 11%)	E-7 to E-9: 8% of sample (Army ~ 19%)
O-3 to O-4: 8% of sample (Army ~ 15%)	E-4 to E6: 9% of sample (Army ~ 18%)

The data presented a dominating case that current policies and practices are potentially creating two groups; (1) individuals that repeatedly deploy and (2) individuals that do not deploy at all. The Task Group observed that end-strength had remained relatively flat since 2001. While increasing end-strength in the Army and Marine Corps may relieve some stress on the force, it would be equally important to maximize the use of existing human capital to achieve the desired strategic effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Group presented their draft findings and recommendations to the full Board on January 22, 2009 (**see Appendix A**). The DBB approved the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense commission a more in-depth study of the Military Services’ force utilization and deployment policies and practices to:

- Review deployment data and make recommendations for a reasonable measure of “stress”,

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- Seek methods to lower the stress on the force and broaden the distribution of that stress across the total force, and
- Examine the Military Services' institutional enterprise assignment policies which appear to create excessive deployments of certain portions of the force while at the same time isolating others from deployment.

CONCLUSION

The DBB shares the Secretary and Chairman's belief that our country's greatest military assets are the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States. It is critical, therefore, that as the Department continues to examine force utilization that we look for any unintended consequences that may disrupt unit cohesion, readiness and families.


The DBB recognizes that force management is an extremely difficult task. The Board's snapshot highlights an uneven utilization of the existing force. Despite the limitations in the data, the Board believes the conclusions present a dominating case. It is clear that almost three quarters of the force have either never been deployed or deployed for less than 12 months, while a smaller population of troops appear to be continuously deployed, creating excessive stress on those troops.

The DBB is hopeful that the Secretary will share the Board's sense of urgency to conduct a more in-depth study of force utilization and move quickly to achieve a healthier and more effective force.

Respectfully submitted,



Michael Bayer
Task Group Co-Chairman



Fred Cook
Task Group Co-Chairman

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APPENDIX A

(TASK GROUP FINAL REPORT– OCTOBER 23, 2008)

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TRANSITION TOPIC:

A Snapshot of the Utilization of Forces

TASK: Examine force utilization of the Military Services by analyzing Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) payroll data of active duty service members to determine how many months these individuals were in a combat zone since 2001

Purpose: To gain insights into the stress on the force and to recommend additional analysis

TASK GROUP:

Michael Bayer (Co-Chair)
Fred Cook (Co-Chair)
Dov Zakheim

Military Assistants

COL Kevin Doxey, USA

Col Dale Marks, USAF



ISSUE:

Since the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, the armed forces are fighting two major overseas conflicts, responding at home and maintaining a heightened state of readiness. This increased operational tempo has caused stress in certain parts of the force.

IMPORTANCE:

- Service leaders have indicated that these requirements are currently being met by longer than desirable deployments, over utilization of certain elements of the force, as well as, stop loss.
- The Army and the Marine Corps are in the process of increasing end strength to meet increased demand.
- Increased end strength alone may not relieve stress sufficiently if the current force is not fully utilized



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DBB Survey Sample Population of DFAS Payroll Data for Active Duty Service Members*


	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINES	AIR FORCE
E1 – E3	353,294	117,125	81,880	88,064	66,225
E4 – E6	673,398	292,893	124,835	89,312	166,358
E7 – E9	217,371	72,649	88,866	14,819	41,037
<i>E1 – E9</i>	<i>1,244,063</i>	<i>482,667</i>	<i>295,581</i>	<i>192,195</i>	<i>273,620</i>
O1 – O2	52,311	18,443	12,745	6,655	14,468
O3 – O4	122,620	46,141	28,817	10,026	37,636
O5 – O6	46,776	16,664	11,605	3,157	15,350
O7 – O10	983	338	250	89	306
<i>O1 – O10</i>	<i>222,690</i>	<i>81,586</i>	<i>53,417</i>	<i>19,927</i>	<i>67,760</i>
GRAND TOTAL	1,466,753	564,253	348,998	212,122	341,380

*Source: Defense Finance and Accounting Service Pay Records December 2008
(For purposes of comparison, does not include Warrant Officers)



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Active Duty Military Services' Authorized End-Strength Over Time "Relatively Flat"





Why Use Hostile Fire Pay?

- It's commonly defined among all Armed Forces
- It's a "truth teller" - Audited by DFAS
- A monthly payment provides a common unit of measure



Why Examine Specific Categories?

- Four categories used:
 - 25 months or greater = “Over Stressed”; individuals who have had multiple unit deployments and/or long-term augmentations
 - 17-24 months = “High Stressed”; individuals who have had two unit deployments and/or long-term augmentation
 - 13-16 months = “Low Stressed”; individuals who have a had at least one unit deployment or long-term augmentation
 - 12 months or less = “Not Stressed”; individuals who have not been on unit deployment or long-term augmentation
- Arbitrary, yet viewed as a reasonable length of time for exposure to conditions that warrant Hostile Fire Pay



Are there limitations?

- The data does not distinguish between special cases (e.g., wounded warriors, non-deployable, or Hostile Fire Pay for visits in and out of the combat zone)
- The data does not include those individuals who entered and left during the 88 month period and may actually underestimate the over-stressed/highly-stressed population
- The DFAS data within the four categories does not reflect the impact of Service specific policies on “dwell-time” to reduce stress on the force



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
Designated Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay Areas by Country or Region, *from Sept 2001 to Present*

Afghanistan	Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire)	Haiti	Malaysia	Sierra Leone
Albania	Cote D'Ivoire	Indonesia	Mediterranean Sea	Somalia
Algeria	Croatia	Iran	Montenegro	Sudan
Angola	Cuba	Iraq	Oman	Syria
Azerbaijan	Djibouti	Israel	Pakistan	Tajikistan
Bahrain	East Timor	Jordan	Peru	Turkey
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Egypt	Kuwait	Philippines	Uganda
Burundi	Eritrea	Kyrgyzstan	Qatar	United Arab Emirates
Cambodia	Ethiopia	Lebanon	Rwanda	Uzbekistan
Chad	Georgia	Liberia	Saudi Arabia	Yemen
Columbia	Greece	Macedonia	Serbia	Yugoslavia



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
Percent of Active Duty **US Military** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present *(excludes Warrant Officers)*





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
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
Percent of Active Duty **US Military Officers** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





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
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
Percent of Active Duty **US Military Enlisted** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





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
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
Percent of Active Duty **US Army Officers** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present *(excludes Warrant Officers)*





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Percent of Active Duty **US Army Enlisted** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





Observations for All Services

- **“Over Stressed” = 25 months or greater**

OFFICERS

O-5 to O-6: 6% of sample
(Army ~ 11%)

O-3 to O-4: 8% of sample
(Army ~ 15%)

ENLISTED

E-7 to E-9: 8% of sample
(Army ~ 19%)

E-4 to E6: 9% of sample
(Army ~ 18%)

- **“Highly Stressed” = 17-24 months**

OFFICERS

O-5 to O-6: 13% of sample
(Army ~ 13%)

O-3 to O-4: 21% of sample
(Army ~ 17%)

ENLISTED


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
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty **US Military Officers, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (*excludes Warrant Officers*)**





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
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
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present





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
25 months or greater of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Enlisted, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present





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
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty **US Military Officers,
by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (*excludes Warrant Officers*)**





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
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty **US Military Officers,
by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present (*excludes Warrant Officers*)**





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
17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty **US Military Enlisted**, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present





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17 – 24 months of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty **US Military Enlisted**, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present





DISCUSSION:

- The data shows a significant number 74% (1,089K) of active duty personnel with ≤ 12 months of combat duty while others 6% (93K) have ≥ 25 months.
- Among the Services, the Army appears to experience the greatest stress as a percentage of the population sample.
- The data indicates that current policies and practices are potentially creating two groups---those that repeatedly deploy and those that don't deploy at all.
- Holding the group with ≥ 25 months as it is, while managing the group with 13-16 months, could control the growth of the group with 17-24 months, and could further reduce the stress on those subjected to excessive deployments.
- Of the sample populations, the data does not identify those individuals subjected to excessive deployments and/or higher rates of deployment, e.g. high demand/low density specialties, or those who may have left the Military Services because of stress.



RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Secretary of Defense should commission a study of the Military Services' force utilization/deployment policies and practices to:

- Review deployment data and make recommendations for a reasonable measure of “stress”
- Seek methods to lower the stress on the force and broaden the distribution of that stress across the Total Force
- Examine the Military Services' institutional enterprise assignment policies which appear to create excessive deployments of certain portions of the force while at the same time isolating others from deployment



Back Up



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Methodology

- DFAS examined pay records of all active duty military servicemembers as of December 2008 to determine who received payment of Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) over the 88 month period from September 2001 to December 2008. The data was provided by rank/grade.

Definitions

- **Hostile Fire Pay:** Special pay for duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger for any month a servicemember is subjected to hostile fire or explosion of a hostile mine, or on duty in an area in close proximity..., killed injured or wounded by hostile fire, explosion of hostile mine, or any other hostile action.
- **Combat Zone:** Area designated to receive hostile fire or imminent danger pay as defined in DoD Financial Management Regulation Vol. 7-A, Chapter 10, Figure 10-1, dated December 2008
- **Stop Loss:** Refers to the involuntary extension of a service member's active duty service under the enlistment contract in order to retain them beyond their end of the term of service (etc). In other words, the military exercises its desultory clause in their contract.



Designated Combat Zones

Afghanistan. This includes the airspace above Afghanistan.

The Kosovo area. The following locations (including air space above) have been designated as a combat zone and a qualified hazardous duty area:

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro)

Albania

The Adriatic Sea

The Ionian Sea - north of the 39th parallel (including all of the airspace in connection with the Kosovo operation.)

Persian Gulf area. The following locations (including air space above) have been designated as a combat zone:

The Persian Gulf

The Red Sea

The Gulf of Oman

The **part of the Arabian Sea** that is north of 10 degrees north latitude and west of 68 degrees east longitude

The Gulf of Aden

The total land areas of **Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates**

Qualified hazardous duty area. A qualified hazardous duty area in **the former Yugoslavia** is treated as if it is a combat zone. The qualified hazardous duty area includes:

Bosnia and Herzegovnia

Croatia

Macedonia



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Raw Data for Active Duty **US Military** reflecting payment of Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

DoD Total															
	TOTAL COHORT	Total Paid	% Total Paid	No HFP	% No HFP	1-12 months	% 1-12 months	No HFP + 12 months or less	% No HFP + 12 months or less	13-16 months	% 13-16 months	17-24 months	% 17-24 months	25 months or greater	% 25 months or greater
E1 to E-3	353,294	83,974	23.77%	269,320	76.23%	72,979	20.66%	342,299	96.89%	8,741	2.47%	1,599	0.45%	655	0.19%
E-4 to E-6	673,398	495,724	73.62%	177,674	26.38%	254,738	37.83%	432,412	64.21%	117,272	17.41%	62,858	9.33%	60,856	9.04%
E-7 to E-9	217,371	159,755	73.49%	57,616	26.51%	93,912	43.20%	151,528	69.71%	26,530	12.20%	20,998	9.66%	18,315	8.43%
total	1,244,063	739,453	59.44%	504,610	40.56%	421,629	33.89%	926,239	74.45%	152,543	12.26%	85,455	6.87%	79,826	6.42%

	TOTAL COHORT	Total Paid	% Total Paid	No HFP	% No HFP	1-12 months	% 1-12 months	No HFP + 12 months or less	% No HFP + 12 months or less	13-16 months	% 13-16 months	17-24 months	% 17-24 months	25 months or greater	% 25 months or greater
O-1 to O-2	52,311	18,383	35.14%	33,928	64.86%	14,239	27.22%	48,167	92.08%	3,035	5.80%	812	1.55%	297	0.57%
O-3 to O-4	122,620	93,630	76.36%	31,990	26.09%	47,945	39.10%	79,935	65.19%	18,632	15.19%	14,470	11.80%	9,583	7.82%
O-5 to O-6	46,776	32,610	69.72%	14,166	30.28%	20,193	43.17%	34,359	73.45%	5,311	11.35%	4,299	9.19%	2,807	6.00%
O-7 to O-10	983	865	88.00%	118	12.00%	455	46.29%	573	58.29%	117	11.90%	146	14.85%	147	14.95%
total	222,690	145,488	65.33%	80,202	36.02%	82,832	37.20%	163,034	73.21%	27,095	12.17%	19,727	8.86%	12,834	5.76%

Total Cohort **1,466,753**



Data Observations of Active Duty **US Military**

- Officer
 - 59% of all officers have received Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)
 - 88% of all General/Flag Officers have received HFP
 - 15% of all General/Flag Officers have 25 months or greater of HFP
 - 6% of O5-O6 have 25 months or greater of HFP
 - 8% of O3-O4 have 25 months or greater of HFP
 - 13% of O5-O6 have 17 months or greater of HFP
 - 21% of O3-O4 have 17 months or greater of HFP
 - 73% of O5-O6 have 12 months or less of HFP
 - 65% of O3-O4 have 12 months or less of HFP




Data Observations of Active Duty **US Military**

- Enlisted
 - 59% of all enlisted have received Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)
 - 74% of NCOs (E4 and above) have received HFP
 - 8% of E7-E9 have 25 months or greater of HFP
 - 9% of E4-E6 have 25 months or greater of HFP
 - 13% of E7-E9 have 17 months or greater of HFP
 - 21% of E4-E6 have 17 months or greater of HFP
 - 70% of E7-E9 have 12 months or less of HFP
 - 64% of E4-E6 have 12 months or less of HFP



Defense Business Board


Percent of Active Duty **US Army Soldiers** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





Defense Business Board


Percent of Active Duty **US Navy** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





Defense Business Board


Percent of Active Duty **US Marines** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





Defense Business Board


Percent of Active Duty **US Air Force** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





Defense Business Board


12 months or less of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty US Military Officers,
by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present *(excludes Warrant Officers)*





Defense Business Board

12 months or less of Hostile Fire Pay Received by Active Duty **US Military Enlisted**, by grade and Service, from September 2001 to Present





Defense Business Board

Average Military Promotion “Pin-On” Times*

Enlisted

Branch	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9
Army	6 mos	12 mos	2 years	4.2 years	8.5 years	13.6 years	17 years	20.8 years
Navy	9 mos	18 mos	3 years	5.2 years	11.3 years	14.4 years	17.1 years	20.3 years
Marines	6 mos	18 mos	3 years	4.8 years	10.4 years	14.8 years	18.8 years	22.1 years
Air Force	6 mos	16 mos	3 years	4.4 years	12.9 years	16.9 years	19.7 years	22.1 years
Average	7 mos	16 mos	3 years	5 years	11 years	15 years	18 years	21 years

Officer


	O-2	O-3	O-4	O-5	O-6
Average	18 mos	4 years	10 years	16 years	22 years

*Data Derived from OSD-P&R: <http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/index.html>; and Congressional Budget Office: <http://www.cbo.gov/>



Defense Business Board

Percent of Active Duty **Army** and **Marine** Captains Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present





Defense Business Board

Percent of Active Duty **Army** and **Marine Majors** Who Have Received Hostile Fire Pay from September 2001 to Present

